



An outbreak of pneumonia caused by a virus initially named 
“2019 novel coronavirus” in Wuhan, China was first reported to 
the World Health Organization (WHO) on December 31, 2019.[1] 
The causative agent of the disease was later identified as “severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2” and named “coronavirus 
disease 2019” (COVID-19) by WHO.[2] On January 13, 2020, 
the first case of the disease outside China was reported in Thailand 
and since then the disease has spread to other countries of the 
world with a large number of confirmed cases and deaths.[3,4]
The WHO declared COVID-19 outbreak a Public Health 
Emergency of international concern on January 30, 2020,[3] and 
a pandemic on March 1, 2020.[5] The WHO further described 
the preparedness, readiness, and response actions for four 
different COVID-19 transmission scenarios and charged 
every country to urgently take all necessary measures to slow 
down its further spread.[3] It emphasized that the virus can be 
contained through early detection, isolation and treatment of 
cases, contact tracing, social and physical distancing, together 
with a well-coordinated and comprehensive approach that 
engages the entire machinery of government.[3]
The Federal Government of Nigeria set up a Presidential Task 
Force (PTF) on COVID-19 on March 9, 2020, with members 
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drawn from key Federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies, 
and the WHO. Similar COVID-19 task forces were set up at 
the state levels to work in collaboration with the PTF.[6]
The first case of the COVID‑19 in Sub‑Saharan Africa was 
reported in Nigeria on February 27, 2020[7,8] in a 44-year-old 
Italian citizen who visited Lagos.[9] As the pandemic continues 
to spread, the Ebonyi State government instituted several 
strategies for its control. Some of the strategies include the 
enactment of Ebonyi State COVID-19 and other Infectious 
Diseases Law 2020,[10] constitution of the State Anti-COVID-19 
Task Force, closure of all borders of entry into the State,[11] and 
imposition of curfew between 8.00 pm and 6.00 am. Others 
are the restriction of the number of passengers for commercial 
transport vehicles to two per seat, banning of social gatherings 
in excess of 20 persons in places of worship and social events, 
and enforcement of the use of face masks in public places.
Until April 26, 2020, Ebonyi State did not record any case of 
COVID‑19 despite confirmation of the disease in neighboring 
States of Enugu, Abia, and Benue.[7] The appearance of an 
index case on April 26, 2020 made Ebonyi State one of the 
last in South-east geopolitical zone of Nigeria to report a 
case. Surprisingly, despite the implementation of these control 
measures, the State recorded more cases than those in the 
neighboring States within a short period of the index case. 
However, the first 13 cases of COVID‑19 detected in Ebonyi 
State were from returnees or their contacts from other States 
intercepted at the borders as “suspected cases” by members 
of the State Anti-COVID-19 Task Force.[9,12-16] However, the 
sudden rise in the number of cases in the state within few weeks 
after the index case aroused the curiosity of the researchers 
to assess the effectiveness of surveillance and lockdown 
operations of the State government at the inter-State borders. 
Our aim was to generate evidence-based recommendations 
for improvement in lockdown strategies for the control of 
infectious diseases.
MaterIals and Methods
This was an exploratory survey carried out in major borders 
of Ebonyi State with her neighbouring States of Abia, Cross 
River, and Enugu Ebonyi State. Ebonyi State is one of the 36 
States of Nigeria with a projected population of 2,880,383.[17] 
The Ebonyi-Enugu border at Ishielu is the busiest both for 
human and vehicular traffics probably because of its direct link 
to Onitsha main market which is acclaimed to be the largest 
market in West Africa[18] and also lies along the trans-Saharan 
highway.
The study population consists of Ebonyi State Anti-COVID-19 
Task force members comprising security health care personnel, 
and political appointees deployed to the inter-state borders 
and those working at Local Government Areas involved in 
monitoring, movement restriction, and screening of commuters 
at the inter-state and inter-LGA borders within the State. All the 
respondents were purposively selected based on their specific 
duties and location. Furthermore, confidential information was 
obtained from three drivers and five commuters at three of 
the borders and four of the returnees arrested by the vigilante 
group (Neighbourhood Watch) and quarantined at the Abakaliki 
Stadium for entering the State through unconventional routes. 
The study instruments consist of an observation checklist and 
a key informant interview (KII) guide.
Data collection lasted for 2 weeks in the month of April 2020. 
Twelve KIIs were conducted across all the five inter‑state 
borders and the respondents comprised: two LGA Chairmen, 
five security personnel and five health‑care workers. Permission 
was taken from the respondents to record the interview using 
an electronic device, complemented by note-taking, and each 
interview lasted for about 45 min.
Observations were independently made by three researchers 
at every border using the checklist and two recordings were 
compared for consistency while the third recording served as 
a tiebreaker for any differences. The checklist was developed 
by the researchers based on the recommended strategies for 
COVID-19 prevention and the tasks assigned to the security 
and health-care personnel deployed to the borders. Data were 
analyzed with IBM-SPSS (International Business Machines - 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (IBM-SPSS) version 
22). The KII recordings were transcribed verbatim within 24 
h and read and re-read to identify the themes, and content 
thematic analysis was finally done.
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Research 
and Ethics Committee of Alex Ekwueme Federal University 
Teaching Hospital Abakaliki Ebonyi State. Verbal permission 
was given by the State Ministry of Health and verbal informed 
consent was obtained from the respondents. They were assured 
of anonymity and confidentiality to remove biases.
results
A total of twelve personnel participated in the KII. They 
comprised five security personnel, five health‑care workers and 
two LGA Chairmen; 15 observation checklists (three for each 
border) were filled but collapsed into five after cross‑checking 
for consistency and the findings were presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
For anonymity purpose, the names of the borders were replaced 
with first, second, third, fourth, and fifth in the KII presentation.
Observations
Each of the borders had at least a security checkpoints but 
some had multiple checkpoints. The checkpoints were manned 
by security personnel drawn from different security agencies 
including the Military, the Police, the Department of State 
Security, the Federal Road Safety Commission and Nigeria 
Security, Civil Defence Corp and COVID-19 Task Force 
members. The security personnel ensured the orderliness of 
commuters and provided security for the health-care workers 
stationed at the tent to screen commuters [Table 1].
All vehicles entering or leaving the State were made to drive 
in a single queue and this resulted in gridlock. However, all the 
drivers that attempted to or beat the queue were immediately 
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intercepted and turned back by the security personnel. Apart 
from trucks carrying essential goods and services, other 
vehicles allowed into the State were those conveying medical 
personnel, food items, construction materials, and petroleum 
products. All passengers of commercial buses who crossed 
the Enugu-Ebonyi border at Ishielu by foot were held back 
and transported in open trucks to a temporary quarantine 
station at the stadium in Abakaliki for proper evaluation before 
handing them over to their Local Government Chairmen for 
documentation and follow-up. All the security personnel were 
observed asking for the address of commuters and enforcing 
the use of face masks by them. However, asking for identity 
cards and destination of commuters were only observed at 
Ebonyi-Enugu border while personnel at the Ebonyi-Cross 
River borders only asked for take‑off points of commuters. 
None of the security personnel were observed asking for 
stop-overs, travel histories, passengers’ manifest or waybills 
of goods or services [Table 1].
Only 1 out of the 5 borders visited by the researchers had a 
holding area (temporary quarantine station) for suspected 
cases and there was no ambulance at any of the borders, 
while all those coming from epicentres were transported 
in open trucks to the quarantine station in Abakaliki. There 
were temporary health posts at each of the borders manned by 
health-care workers but the holding area was only observed 
at the Ishielu border [Table 2].
All the health-care personnel wore their face masks; however, 
only health personnel in 3 out of the 5 borders observed 
physical distancing during the screening of commuters. Each 
of the health post had a functional infrared thermometer, but the 
appropriate technique of temperature checking was observed 
in four of the borders.
All the health posts had alcohol-based hand sanitizer but 
the  availability of an improvised running tap in a moveable 
refillable container (Veronica Bucket) with water and soap 
for hand washing was only observed at the Ebonyi-Cross 
River (Izzi) border. All commuters seen at the borders were 
observed to practice hand hygiene and wearing face masks. 
None of the health-care workers was observed asking for 
contact of commuters with a suspected or confirmed case of 
COVID-19 and none was keeping record of phone numbers of 
suspected cases. There were no ambulances at any of the border 
health posts and none of them had any information, education, 
and communication materials for COVID-19 [Table 2].
Observations at the adjacent borders of other States at 
Ishielu and Abaomege (for Enugu and Cross River States, 
respectively) revealed lighter pressure from human and 
vehicle movements compared to that of Ebonyi borders. There 
were fewer security and health personnel, and screening with 
enforcement of COVID-19 prevention measures was not very 
thorough.
Thematic analysis of key informant interviews
Three sub-themes emerged from the interviews held with 
the security and health-care personnel. These include border 
security, orderliness, and enforcement of movement restriction; 
screening of commuters for COVID-19; and enforcement of 
COVID-19 preventive measures among commuters. Verbatim 
quotes were presented in italics.
Border security, orderliness, and enforcement of 
movement restriction
The uniformed personnel ensured the security of persons at the 
borders; they maintained orderliness and restricted movement 
of vehicles across the borders in line with the directive of the 
State government. The only persons allowed into the State 
were those on essential duties or vehicles carrying essential 
goods. One of the security personnel interviewed at the first 
border said:
Table 1: Findings from observations at the security checkpoints of the interstate borders
Observations Name of borders Frequency 
















Presence of security personnel + + + + + 5 (100)
Presence of check points at the border + + + + + 5 (100)
Asking for address of commuters + + + + + 5 (100)
Asking for destination of commuters + + + + + 5 (100)
Enforcement of use of face masks by commuters + + + + + 5 (100)
Asking for identity card from commuters on essential duties + - - - - 1 (20.0)
Asking for take‑off points of commuters - - - + - 1 (20)
Asking for stop-over of commuters - - - - - 0
Asking for travel history to high-risk area - - - - - 0
Asking for destination of commuters + - - - - 0
Asking for passengers’ manifest - - - - - 0
Asking for waybills of goods and services - - - - - 0
+: Observed activity, ‑: Not observed
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Table 2: Findings from observations at the health posts of the interstate borders
Observations Name of borders Frequency 
















Presence of health personnel + + + + + 5 (100)
Presence of holding area + - - - - 1 (20)
Wearing of facemask by health-care personnel + + + + + 5 (100)
Observation of physical distancing by health workers during 
screening of commuters
- - + + + 3 (60)
Availability of functional infrared thermometer + + + + + 5 (100)
Appropriate technique of temperature checking + + + + - 4 (80)
Availability of alcohol-based hand sanitizer + + + + + 5 (100)
Availability of veronica bucket for hand washing - - - + - 1 (20)
Water and soap for handwashing - - - + - 1 (20)
Asking for contact of commuters with suspected or 
confirmed case of COVID‑19
- - - - - 0
Keeping record of phone numbers of suspects - - - - - 0
Presence of ambulance - - - - - 0
Presence of IEC materials on COVID-19 for commuters - - - - - 0
+: Observed activity, ‑: Not observed, COVID‑19: Coronavirus disease 2019, IEC: Information, education, and communication
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“We are the ones in charge of the border to ensure there is 
orderliness and commuters obey the instructions.”
Another informant at the fourth border put it this way:
“In collaboration with the COVID-19 task force, only persons on 
essential duty or carrying essential goods are allowed into the 
State. We also ensure that people do not enter the State through 
bush paths by having some task force members in the bush paths.”
The information given by the informants corresponds with the 
observation made by the researchers.
Screening of commuters for coronavirus disease 2019
Both the security and the health personnel stated that they 
ensured that all commuters were subjected to screening for 
COVID-19 at the borders. Many of the security personnel 
also asked for travel history from the commuters and those 
coming from States reporting many cases of COVID-19 were 
not allowed into the State. A security man at the first borders 
summarized the role of the security personnel in the screening 
process like this:
 “We ensure people who get here surrender themselves for 
check by the healthcare personnel and get the necessary 
screening. We also ask the commuters to tell us the State 
they are coming from and if it is from any State with many 
cases of COVID-19, we hold them back and send them to 
quarantine station (at the Abakaliki township stadium) 
for further evaluation.”
Another security personnel interviewed at the third border 
had these to say:
 “We only allow vehicles carrying essential goods to pass 
and persons on essential duty. Other travelers are turned 
back. The persons we allow to pass must be screened for 
temperature and use hand sanitizer before they cross the 
border into the State.”
Similarly, another security personnel affirmed that:
 “The few persons that want to pass the border must 
be asked where they are coming from. If the State is 
where there is COVID-19, we move them to Abakaliki 
stadium. Every person passing is directed to the 
health team to check their temperature and apply hand 
sanitizer” (Informant, fourth border).
Again, the information obtained from the respondents 
largely corresponded with the observations made by the 
researchers.
All the health-care workers, on the other hand, screened the 
commuters for fever. According to a health care worker:
 “At the border, our job is to screen the travelers coming 
into the State to identify those who have high-grade fever 
as these persons may have the suspected disease.” But we 
go back to Abakaliki daily around 6.00pm and all those 
that arrive later wait till the next morning for us to arrive 
and screen them before entering the State (Informant, first 
border).
A similar observation was reported by another health personnel 
who said:
 With the support of the security agents, every traveler 
passing is directed to us to check their temperature and 
also give them hand sanitizers and ensure they rub their 
hands (Informant, fifth border).
At one of the borders, the health-care workers enquired about 
the travel history of the commuters in addition to checking 
their temperatures. Commuters with travel histories to high-risk 
States or countries are further referred to the security personnel 
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for onward transfer to the quarantine station at the Abakaliki 
township stadium. One of the health-care workers had this to say:
 “We ensure every person that is crossing the border has 
their temperature checked. We ask about where they are 
travelling from and inform the task force and security 
personnel if they are coming from States with a high 
burden of COVID-19” (Informant, second border).
Enforcement of coronavirus disease 2019 preventive 
measures and movement restrictions among commuters
Whereas the security personnel ensured that all commuters put 
on face masks, the health workers made sure the commuters 
either washed their hands under running water with soap or 
had them sanitized with alcohol-based hand rub. Security 
personnel in one of the borders with improvised hand washing 
device stated thus:
 “We have Veronica Bucket with detergent that every 
person that can pass must wash their hands. Then we 
ensure the medical team checks temperature and sanitize 
the travelers’ hands” (Informant, fourth border).
The security personnel also made sure that commuters put 
on a face mask before passing the border. Our respondent in 
another border added this:
 “Anyone coming from States like Lagos and Kano (Lagos 
is the epicenter of the outbreak in Nigeria and Kano is 
the second worst-hit city) are stopped till we move them 
to Abakaliki stadium where the health personnel decides 
on their case. We also direct them to meet the medical 
team at the border hand sanitizing and temperature 
check” (Informant, second border).
In a frustrated look, one of the respondents described their 
challenges with the following sentences:
 “There is too much pressure here because other State 
governments are not enforcing the inter-State ban on 
movement. I cannot imagine someone travelling from 
Lagos or Abuja to this place without being stopped. If they 
are prevented from leaving their States, they wouldn’t 
come here to disturb us, and it is difficult for us to simply 
send them back.” (Informant, first border).
All the health-care workers said they screened all commuters 
for fever and ensured they all practiced hand hygiene by 
washing or sanitizing their hands before crossing the border. 
These are how some of the participants presented their roles 
at the borders:
 “We administered hand sanitizers to the travelers with 
the aim of reducing the transmission of the virus while at 
the border and within the State” (Informant, first border).
Another informant at the third border added:
 “We see very few persons who drive through the border. 
And they all use hand sanitizers and we check their 
temperature.”
Confidential information from some of the commuters arrested 
for sneaking into the State through the bush and quarantined at 
the Abakaliki stadium revealed that most of them were refused 
entry at the Ishielu border. Others decided to enter through 
the neighboring communities due to fear of being detained 
at the Stadium for 14 days under uncomfortable conditions. 
A narrative from one of them was:
 “I was on a short visit to Lagos when the lockdown was 
pronounced but had to come back due to the challenges 
of surviving in Lagos. I have no other place to go than to 
return home despite the difficulties of travelling across 
6 other States before getting to Ebonyi. I paid a lot of 
money for motorcycle to carry me through the villages 
while trying to avoid the border but only to be arrested 
by the ‘Neighbourhood Watch’ and brought to this place.”
dIscussIon
The delayed appearance of the first COVID‑19 case was 
probably due to the early closure of the major borders of 
entry into the State, an action that the State government took 
more than a month before the Federal Government of Nigeria 
deemed it necessary to ban interstate travelling as part of 
the measures to fight the dreaded pandemic.[7,11,19,20] This 
operation may have prevented the importation of COVID-19 
by the movement of persons from other States into Ebonyi. 
A previous study had revealed that severe travel restrictions 
were associated with a reduction in COVID-19 cumulative 
incidence as it decreases the slope of cumulative cases by at 
least 50%.[21]
Attempts to achieve the purpose of the border closure in 
preventing entry of COVID-19 cases into the State was clearly 
demonstrated by the security personnel who were observed 
enforcing movement restrictions for nonessential service 
commuters at the State borders. The fact that all the borders had 
checkpoints, and some multiples of it, manned by an array of 
security personnel and members of the State Anti-COVID-19 
task force may have made border crossing more difficult or 
even impossible, thereby reducing the number of infected 
persons entering the State. Breakdown of the first 13 cases 
of COVID‑19 confirmed in the State shows that majority 
of them were suspected contacts intercepted by members of 
Anti-COVID-19 Task Force,[13-16] thus lending credence to the 
effectiveness of the border closure and surveillance activities in 
preventing the spread of the disease in the State, a development 
that received the commendation from the Nigeria Center for 
Disease Control.[22]
However, the movement restriction efforts of the security 
personnel at the borders were not without hitches and gaps. 
For instance, the observed disagreement over supremacy for 
authority at a border could undermine the overall goal of the 
border control through the issuance of counter instructions to 
commuters by different personnel from another security group. 
Although there may be differences in the usual job description 
of the security agents, a common goal of the border control 
at this period of COVID-19 crisis is to enforce movement 
restriction in line with the directive of the State government 
and this should be understood by all the groups of security 
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personnel involved. This underscores the need for the State 
government to ensure a coordinated inter-agency action of 
the security personnel through the clear specification of roles 
and delegation of a single superior authority that should be 
in-charge of all the security agents in any border. Without such 
a clear definition of tasks and responsibilities, the organization 
and provision of joint activities and operations may cause 
friction, rivalries, and duplication of activities at operational 
levels.[23]
Furthermore, some respondents in the KII stated that they 
allowed passage across the borders only for the commuters 
rendering essential services but our observation showed that 
majority of the security personnel neither asked for the identity 
of the commuters who claimed to be on essential duties nor 
inquired about their take‑off points, stop‑overs, travel histories, 
waybills, or their final destinations as a way of truly identifying 
those at high risks for COVID-19 transmission. According to 
the WHO, majority (80%) of COVID‑19 infections have mild 
symptoms or asymptomatic, while only 15% and 5% present 
with severe and critical infections, respectively.[24] These 
facts therefore underscore the importance of thorough border 
screening of commuters as an indispensable component of 
surveillance at the borders during lockdown to curb the spread 
of infectious diseases.
Inadequate screening for COVID-19 signs and symptoms, as 
generally observed in both the health and security posts at all 
the borders could have meant that some commuters infected 
with the virus may have been missed out and allowed entry 
into the State, thereby resulting in the spread of infection. 
Surprisingly, none of the KII respondents mentioned asking 
the drivers for passengers’ manifest or waybills for goods. 
The discrepancy between what was reported by the security 
personnel and what was observed by the researchers suggests 
there may be gaps in the surveillance and enforcement of 
movement restrictions, and therefore calls for expedited review 
of the protocol for operations at the borders.
The reported enforcement on the use of face masks, the 
practice of hand hygiene, and screening of commuters for 
high temperature are good practices that should be upheld 
by the security and health personnel at the borders. This was 
corroborated by the confidential information obtained from 
some of the drivers and commuters that crossed the borders. 
However, the observations of poor hand washing or sanitizing 
technique among commuters, the inappropriate technique 
of checking temperature, and non observance of physical 
distancing during screening of commuters by health-care 
workers are indications of gaps in knowledge and skills for 
screening among the health-care workers on one hand and poor 
risk perception about COVID-19 infection by the commuters 
on the other. These observations emphasize the need for health 
workers training and commuter education about the modes of 
transmission of COVID-19.
Since COVID-19 has been described as highly contagious 
with a reported basic reproduction number of 5.7,[25] keeping 
suspected cases (especially those with symptoms) in 
unprotected places around the security and health personnel at 
the borders while waiting for an ambulance to arrive constitutes 
a high risk for infection transmission. Furthermore, keeping 
the late arrivals overnight at the border appears impracticable 
and exposes them to other dangers such as assault and rape. 
Each border should have a designated holding area and a 
standby ambulance for conveying suspected and symptomatic 
cases to isolation and quarantine centers. There should also 
be provisions for managing severe cases under emergency 
conditions.
For inter-State travel ban and lockdown at the borders to be 
effective in the control of COVID‑19 spread in Nigeria, it must 
be an all-inclusive decision to be taken and enforced by all the 
State governments. It should be well announced, and enough 
time given to enable those on temporary visits to other States 
to return to their permanent places of residents. COVID-19 
prevention and control measures are capital intensive and 
should be well-coordinated with adequate mobilization and 
judicious use of resources. The lockdown approach should 
be combined with aggressive public education and risk 
communication messages targeted at various classes of the 
population, together with enforcement of compliance with 
prevention strategies and distribution of palliatives to reduce 
suffering among the vulnerable groups.
conclusIon
Movement restrictions and surveillance activities at inter State 
borders can be effective means of controlling COVID‑19 
importation and spread across the States if it is well-coordinated 
and collaborative among the various arms of the governments 
across the States, and with the uniformed security agencies 
and vigilante groups. There should be adequate and reliable 
screening measures to identify suspected cases, together with 
risk communication and strict enforcement of prevention 
strategies. Streamlining the order of command among the 
security personnel, capacity building of the health-care 
workers, and provision of holding areas and ambulances for 
suspected cases at the major borders would improve orderliness 
and case detection among commuters. Further studies on risk 
perception and challenges of compliance with prevention 
measures among various population groups are recommended.
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